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COMMENT
IN THE WAKE OF VIA RAIL: IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE
CONSIDERATIONS∗

This comment focuses on the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Council
of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc. (2007) and attempts to
explore the Court’s reasoning in the decision and the subsequent effects that
may flow from it. This comment also touches briefly on the recent case of
New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir and the complications
stemming from it. The comment concludes that it remains uncertain how
these newly developed dynamics from VIA Rail and Dunsmuir will interact
with the broader legal and policy forces shaping the duty to accommodate.

When the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in
Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc.1 in
March of 2007, the majority judgment was hailed as victory for the
disabled and, more generally, a development that would “empower
human rights activists.”2 Practitioners immediately saw the Court’s
∗
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1 2007 SCC 15, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 650, 279 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [VIA].
2 “SCC’s Via Rail ruling may impact industry: experts” ( 23 March 2007), online: CTV
News
<http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20070323/VIA_rail_070323/
20070323?hub=CTVNewsAt11>
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reasoning, which upheld the Canadian Transportation Agency’s
(CTA) decision to order VIA Rail to make 40 of 139 “Renaissance” cars
wheelchair accessible, as having implications that could reach well
beyond the rather limited federal transportation scheme. Indeed, in a
popular media interview, counsel for the Canadian Human Rights
Commission Leslie Reaume noted that the ruling could have an
impact on any issue coming before a federal tribunal and, in
particular, “this decision has implications for every administrative
adjudicator who is dealing with a human rights issue.”3
A year after the release of the decision, VIA Rail’s impact on
administrative decision makers dealing with human rights issues
remains elusive. To be sure, the CTA has since demonstrated that it
has taken the majority reasons as an affirmation of a strong mandate
to consider and apply human rights principles in the course of
adjudications.4 But, the interplay between public law principles and
human rights considerations that Reaume noted could alter
administrative decision making in the wake of VIA Rail have always
been transient; certainly, evidence of the tenuous ground on which
the majority reasons stand is apparent in the 5-4 split in the decision.
Notwithstanding the split, the majority opinion should be
recognized as a concerted attempt to bring human rights principles to
the fore of the administrative process. This is best illustrated by the
stark disagreement between the majority and minority in the VIA
Rail decision over two central issues: the appropriate standard of
review to be applied to human rights-related decisions in an
administrative setting, and the approach to statutory interpretation
and the role of individual administrative tribunals when dealing with
human rights legislation.
It is crucial to note, however, that public law has changed
dramatically in the twelve months since the Court handed down its
judgment.
For example, the Dunsmuir 5decision’s wrenching
modification to the law of judicial review in Canada should be viewed
as a particularly worrisome development to those who see VIA Rail as
a powerful tool in the human rights activist’s toolbox. Certainly, VIA
Rail’s unquestionable ambition is now laden with potential failings.
Ibid.
Canadian Transportation Agency Decision No. 6-AT-A-2008, (2008) at para. 100.
5
New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir].
3
4
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Much of the potential impact of VIA Rail for human rights
law and policy flows from what are, ostensibly, changes to the
substantive review methodology in the majority judgment. There,
Abella J. deviates from the conventional view that administrative
decisions that have the effect of applying human rights principles in
adjudicating disputes—which, therefore, are questions of law within
the relative expertise of courts—are subject to a non-deferential
standard of correctness in judicial review.
This principle is longstanding in Canadian administrative law6
and, indeed, the minority treats this principle as a given. In their
dissent, Deschamps J. and Rothstein J. argue that holding to this
precedent is particularly important here: the CTA’s determination of
the particular human rights principles applicable within the statutory
scheme—across the federal transportation context—had not been
either adjudicated or scrutinized judicially, giving the decision
precedential value with a potentially pervasive legal effect.7 The
minority’s method, then, is unremarkable: it simply reflects the
Court’s usual reliance on the pragmatic and functional approach
jurisprudence since Pushpanathan.8
In contrast, the majority’s analysis is novel. In broad strokes,
Justice Abella’s approach represents a dynamic view of the interaction
between human rights “law” and administrative mechanisms,
resulting in a rather dramatic movement towards judicial deference
and flexibility in substantive review.
The concern driving the majority approach here is a seeming
frustration with the growing complexity in substantive review, and
especially with respect to various courts’ inclination to segment and
thereby limit a tribunal’s jurisdiction through an overly rigourous
application of the pragmatic and functional approach. Certainly,
much of the most pointed language in the majority decision is
reserved to attack the recent trend towards the application of multiple

See e.g. Trinity Western University v. College of Teachers (British Columbia), 2001
SCC 31, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 at 805.
7 VIA, supra note 1 at para. 282.
8 Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1998] 1
S.C.R. 1222, 11 Admin. L.R. (3d) 130 [Pushpanathan].
6
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standards of review to different parts of a tribunal’s decision.9 In VIA
Rail, this differential standard approach was adopted at the Federal
Court of Appeal, where two judges of the three-judge panel ruled that
while the CTA determination of undue obstacles must be reviewed
under a standard of patent unreasonableness, a jurisdictional question
raising human rights issues should be subject to a correctness
standard.10
The response by Justice Abella to the lower court on this issue
is emphatic:
It seems to me counterproductive for courts to parse and
recharacterize aspects of a tribunal’s core jurisdiction, like
the Agency’s discretionary authority to make regulations
and adjudicate complaints, in a way that undermines the
deference that jurisdiction was conferred to protect…I do
not share the view that the issue before the Agency was, as
a human rights matter, subject to review on a standard of
correctness. This unduly narrows the characterization of
what the Agency was called upon to decide and disregards
how inextricably interwoven the human rights and
transportation issues are.11

Abella J.’s purposive conception of statutory authority leans
toward the view of judicial deference taken by Justice Bertha Wilson
in dissent almost two decades ago, when the tension between the
“rule of law” approach and administrative prerogatives was still
youthful in Canadian public law. In National Corn Growers, Wilson
J. argued that judicial scrutiny should only extend to determining
whether or not “the Tribunal [is] dealing with the kind of issue that it
was set up to deal with” under a standard of patent
Interestingly, this decision was released only one day after Lévis (Ville) c. Côté,
2007 SCC 14, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 591, 278 D.L.R. (4th) 577,where the Court held that it
was appropriate to use multiple standards of review.
10 Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc. 2005 FCA 79, 251
D.L.R. (4th) 418, rev’d 2007 SCC 15, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 650, 279 D.L.R. (4th) 1. More
specifically, this question concerned the ability of the CTA to exercise its regulatory
authority under Canada Transporation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10, s. 172 [CTA] in response
to a complaint application that did not result from “actual travel experience”; VIA,
supra note 1 at para. 74.
11 VIA, supra note 1 at paras. 96-97.
9
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unreasonableness.12 This formulation would have seemed to establish
a “black box” approach under patent unreasonableness review,
which—after determining whether a tribunal’s enabling legislation
allowed it to consider a broadly defined issue area—would require a
reviewing court to accord the tribunal almost absolute deference.13
In VIA Rail, the majority leans toward absolute deference
when framing their approach. Part V of the CTA gives the tribunal a
broad investigative and regulatory jurisdiction to cope with obstacles
to accommodation in the federal transportation context that are, in
Justice Abella’s words, “interwoven” with a variety of legal and policy
issues.14 Following from this analysis, the difficulty and indeterminacy
that the majority notes are inherent in the untangling of these
elements push substantive review towards an area where an
additional focused scrutiny—an addition to an otherwise highly
deferential approach—will be inappropriate. If the Court continues
in this vein in situations of judicial review, the ability of expert policy
tribunals to make a broader range of factual and legal determinations
free from strict oversight will be greatly enlarged.
Outside the purview of judicial review and within the
framework governing the use and interpretation of legislation by
tribunals, VIA Rail marks the judicial acceptance of a newly robust
role for a wider variety of statutory decision makers in the human
rights policy process.
As the majority in VIA Rail notes, this acceptance is driven in
part by the emerging recognition by courts that administrative
tribunals should be allowed to stray from their enabling statutes when
interpreting and applying their constituting legislation, and especially
when considering issues with human rights implications. For our
purposes here, the crucial affirmation of this principle was given in
Tranchemontagne, where the majority held that there is a rebuttable
presumption that a statutory tribunal has the jurisdiction to consider
National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Canadian Import Tribunal), [1990] 2
S.C.R. 1324, 74 D.L.R. (4th) 449, at para. 106 Wilson J [National Corn Growers].
13 Ibid. Much of Wilson’s approach seems to be explicitly adopted by the majority at
paragraph 104 in VIA. Judicial ratification of this vision of patent unreasonableness is
belied, however, by the majority’s extensive review of the CTA’s processes and
conclusions in the decision—an investigative process that more closely mirrors the
majority judgment that Wilson was protesting against in National Corn Growers.
14 VIA, supra note 1 at para. 97.
12
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statutes outside of its enabling legislation in order to fulfill its
mandate.15
This concept builds on the administrative law
jurisprudence emerging since Martin, where the Court held that
tribunals can consider and apply constitutional principles in
conjunction with issues arising in their adjudicative capacity.16 Chief
Justice McLachlin’s concern in Martin mirrors the sentiment
underlying the majority reasons in Tranchemontagne:
…it is undesirable for a tribunal to limit itself to
some of the law while shutting its eyes to the rest of the
law. The law is not so easily compartmentalized that all
relevant sources on a given issue can be found in the
provisions of a tribunal’s enabling statute.17

This strand in the jurisprudence endorses the argument that
administrative tribunals now have a broad plenary jurisdiction to
consider outside legislation (subject to legislative exception) in
carrying out their specific statutory mandates. The broad effect of this
is to undermine the existence of administrative structures as
compartmentalized policy actors and encourage a functional overlap;
in the instant case, for example, it was held that an agency conceived
for the regulation of federal transportation services acted lawfully in
carrying out a function traditionally monopolized by a human rights
tribunal.
What is novel in VIA Rail with respect to the admittance of
myriad tribunals to the arena of human rights, however, is the
movement in the Court towards an “aspirational” form of statutory
interpretation that has the duty to accommodate as a central concern.
In VIA Rail, this had the effect of pushing the goal of elevating human
rights principles closer to the center of these diverse tribunals’
adjudicative processes. This is particularly evident in the decision’s
Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program) 2006 SCC 14,
[2006] 1 S.C.R. 513, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 287 [Tranchemontagne].
16 Martin v. Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) 2003 SCC 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R.
504, 4 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1 [Martin]. Interestingly, the majority in Martin noted that
constitutional “questions” decided by a tribunal would be subject to judicial review on
a correctness standard.
17 VIA, supra note 1 at para. 114, citing from Tranchmontagne, supra note 13 at para.
26.
15
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varied treatment of s. 5 of the CTA,18 where the majority’s use of a
very loose interpretive framework stands in stark contrast to the
minority’s close textual reading.
As noted above, s. 5 of the Act is a declaratory provision
outlining the Act’s National Transportation Policy, which states a
number of goals that govern the regulatory framework underlying the
federal transportation system.19 These goals include, for example:
safety, the preservation of market forces and competition in the
system, the flow of commodities, and, of course, the duty to
accommodate the disabled.
The minority decision situates the duty to accommodate
disabled persons among the other enumerated duties in s. 5. Indeed,
their judgment in favour of VIA Rail hinges in part on the ruling that
the tribunal erred in law by being “dismissive” in their consideration
of the costs of refurbishing the cars.20 Put another way, the CTA failed
to adequately balance the interests protected in s. 5 by placing
disproportionate weight on the duty to accommodate even though the
legislature plainly intended that they exist alongside each other.
The minority further dilutes the potential strength of the
provision as a tool for disability concerns by noting the presence of
two explicit “limiting” functions within s. 5. The minority points first
to s. 5(g) of the Act, which has the effect of stating that carriers
accommodate persons with disabilities “as far as is practicable.”21
They argue that such a use of this phrase denotes that the legislature
intended “that the objectives are not expected to be achieved to the
level of perfection.”22 The second limitation is the use of the adjective
“undue” prior to the word “obstacle” in s.5 (g)(ii) itself. For the
minority, “the mobility of persons may be subject to obstacles, but the
objective of the Policy is that mobility not be impeded by undue
obstacles.”23
This restrictive interpretation is diametrically opposed to the
majority’s highly liberal perspective of how the statute must be read.
As the basis for this interpretation, the decision draws on the
Supra, note 9.
Ibid.
20 VIA, supra note 1 at para. 354.
21 VIA, supra note 1 at para 290.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
18
19
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legislative history of the CTA,24 as well as the directive in s. 171 that
requires the CTA to “coordinate” its activities and policies with the
Canada Human Rights Commission, in order to assert that the act is
human rights legislation; the CTA, therefore, enjoys quasiconstitutional status that allows it to supercede other legislated policy
concerns.25
The conclusion that the CTA has significant human rights
content is not remarkable per se; indeed, the minority decision agrees
with the majority that the extent to which an “obstacle” is “undue”
must be established using the Meiorin test.26 The test governs
reasonable accommodation in labour and employment law27 and, in

BC (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v BC (Commissioner of
Human Rights),28 was deemed the applicable test for most human
rights disputes involving accommodation issues. At the very least,
then, both sides of the Court understand this dispute as human rights
adjudication that necessitates importation of principles and law
originating outside of the relevant statute.
The novelty of VIA Rail lies in the impact the conflation of
the CTA and human rights principles broadly has on the majority’s
method of statutory interpretation. While the presence of human
rights principles inform the minority’s analytical framework, they
determine the majority approach. Indeed, the majority differs
fundamentally from the minority in the analysis of s. 5: rather than
seeing the s. 5 assertion of a duty to accommodate as simply one
enumerated factor among many, the majority treats it as the central
and, arguably, the sole concern in the provision.
This determination is evidenced in two ways, both of which
mark divergences from the minority opinion. Unsurprisingly, given
the assumption stated above, the majority treats the s. 5 goals other
than the accommodation of disabilities not as distinct considerations,
but rather as factors that should be considered when determining
whether or not removing an obstacle would represent an “undue

Ibid. at paras. 112, 113.
Ibid. at paras. 115-116
26 British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council
of Human Rights) [1999] 3 S.C.R. 868,181 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
27 Ibid. at para. 296.
28 Supra, note 26.
24
25
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hardship” for a carrier.29 This standard, as noted above, is the central
consideration in the third branch of the Meiorin test, which arises
directly in the context of s. 5(g)ii of the CTA. As a result, the
majority’s reading of the National Transportation Policy reduces
seemingly distinct and equal clauses within the provision to mere
considerations that arise only within the paramount duty to
accommodate contained in s. 5(g)ii.
Also notable is that the majority ignores the use of the
limiting phrase “as far as is practicable” in s. 5(g). Abella J. argues that
the phrase is only “the statutory acknowledgement of the ‘undue
hardship’ standard in the transportation context.”30 Problematically,
however, both the minority and majority agree that the Meiorin test
arises from and is to be applied specifically in conjunction with the s.
5(g)ii “undue obstacle” analysis. Considering this, the construction of
the statute seems to render the “practicability” qualifier in s. 5(g)
distinct from the “undue obstacle” analysis required by s. 5(g)ii. As
alluded to above, this bifurcated approach could require that two
balancing tests be undertaken in establishing whether a carrier has a s.
5 responsibility to accommodate disabled persons. The first hurdle
would be the “undueness” test in the application of Meiorin in s.
5(g)ii; the second would require that—even if it were established that
an obstacle to access was not justified under Meiorin—the obstacle
would still only have to be removed if it were “practicable” for the
carrier to do so under s. 5(g). Obviously, by reading s. 5(g) and s.
5(g)ii as coterminous, the majority abandons this latter bar to finding
a positive duty to accommodate; in doing so, the decision effectively
denies that s. 5(g) could have legal effect.
Of course, the standard of proof that carriers must satisfy in
justifying the presence of barriers to access is markedly higher under
this interpretation, which is very much in line with the notion noted
above “that where there is a conflict between human rights law and
other specific legislation, unless an exception is created, the human
rights legislation…must govern.”31 This statement serves as a concise
judicial summary of the disparate developments in the public law

VIA, supra note 1 at para. 135.
Ibid. at para. 137
31 Ibid. at para. 115.
29
30
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jurisprudence that is pushing human rights to the forefront in the
administrative decision-making process.

CONCLUSIONS
It remains uncertain how these dynamics will interact with
broader legal and policy forces shaping the duty to accommodate.
When considering the courts, for example, it is widely accepted by
scholars that the duty to accommodate has wrought a significant
transformation on the way employers and service provides must
interact with disabled persons, but the specific content of that duty—
in other words, how courts determine that content—remains very
unclear.32 Michael Lynk has recently noted that this has to do with
numerous factors, first among which is the inattention common law
courts have paid to the duty to accommodate relative to human rights
tribunals.33 A crucial result of this, Lynk argues, is that judges have
not come to terms with a unified application of the Meiorin test when
assessing whether a duty does exist within a specific relationship;
instead, individual decisions have tended to focus on specific factors
within the three-factor test to the exclusion of others.34 This is
obviously a highly problematic methodology, as it results in many
possible interpretations of Meiorin rather than a single, governing set
of applicable principles. Currently, the Supreme Court has reserved
judgment on this issue (among others) in Keays v Honda; it seems,
then, that the common law dispute is ongoing.
More important are developments in public law over the past
year that could affect the application of the duty to accommodate—by

For a comprehensive account of these issues, see Michael Lynk, “Disability and
Work: The Transformation of the Legal Status of Employees with Disabilities in the
Canadian Workplace,” in Law Society of Upper Canada 2007 Special Lectures:
Employment Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) 189 [Lynk, “Transformation”].
33 See ibid. at 193, 244.
34 Ibid. at 253-254. Here, Lynk focuses specifically on the decision at the Ontario
Court of Appeal in Keays v Honda, (2006) 82 O.R. (3d) 161, 274 D.L.R. (4th) 107 in
which the majority effectively applied only the second step of Meiorin—the “good
faith” test—in assessing whether an employer had failed to accommodate an
employee. It is also worth noting that VIA dealt in passing with this sort of issue.
There, the minority explicitly drew attention to general uncertainty surrounding the
application of Meiorin by noting that the majority seemingly failed to strictly apply
the first two steps of that test in their analysis. See VIA, supra note 1 at para. 367.
32
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way of the underlying principles and processes governing it—as
envisioned by the Court in VIA Rail.
With respect to the statutory scheme, the CTA, and with it,
the National Transportation Policy, was amended with the passage of
Bill C-11 several months after VIA Rail was released in March 2007.35
The structural effect of the amendments has been to reword the
declaration in s. 5, and to condense enumerated principles following
that declaration to five contained in subsections s. 5(a) – (e). For the
purposes of this essay, the significant differences from the previous
incarnation of the CTA are that s. 5 now contains no reference to
“disability” in the initial declaration, and the reference to
“practicability” in what was formerly s. 5(g) has been removed. It is
thus far unclear how these statutory changes will affect the duty to
accommodate in federal transportation as understood by the Court in
VIA Rail, if they do at all. Indeed, it could be argued that the
amendments codify the majority’s reading of s. 5 by abandoning a
“practicability” statement; it is possible that courts would see this as
an affirmation of the decision, rather than a legislative change
necessitating a judicial one.
What the amended version of s. 5 underscores, however, is
that any emerging duty grounded in part by a specific statute—and
especially one as seemingly innocuous and uncontroversial as the
CTA—is potentially subject to summary modification by legislatures.
Of course, this basic fact of the public policy process will not
necessarily affect the principle of accommodation positively or
negatively; it merely illustrates the inherent fluidity and
indeterminacy of the duty in the federal transportation context, and
others similar to it.
It is probable that dramatic changes made to the substantive
review process by the Court will have a much greater impact on the
application of the duty to accommodate than any modification to the
statutory scheme. While it is too early to assess even the preliminary
Bill C-11, An Act to Amend the Canada Transportation Act and the Railway Safety
Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 2007, (Royal Assent
35

received 22 June 2007). It is also important to note that the legislative history
indicates that the amending process was largely over by the time VIA Rail was
decided. As a result, it is not likely that the Court’s decisions on accommodation
issues had a significant impact on the amendments made to s. 5; this argument is
reinforced by Parliament’s decision to leave Part V of the CTA unchanged.
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impact of the Dunsmuir case’s abandonment of the standard of patent
unreasonableness, this development could affect how statutory
decisions makers and the courts “supervising” them intervene in
human rights disputes.
Certainly, the impact of Dunsmuir will be widespread and is
not specific to accommodation issues or human rights law alone;
rather, it will affect all administrative decisions simply because the
courts will have to redefine the concept of reasonableness in light of
the Supreme Court’s conclusion “that the two variants of
reasonableness review [formerly reasonableness and patent
unreasonableness] should be collapsed into a single form of
‘reasonableness’ review.”36 While the Court does note that they do
not intend for judicial review to become “more intrusive”37 as a result
of Dunsmuir, they emphasize that “the concept of ’deference as
respect’” requires of the courts ‘“submission but respectful attention to
the reasons offered or which could be offered in support of a
decision.’”38
As a result, Dunsmuir can be understood in the short term as a
huge complication of the existing law of judicial review in Canada.
Dunsmuir requires the conflation of levels of judicial deference that
the Court had purposefully and laboriously kept separate for years; the
above quoted principles of deference enunciated in Dunsmuir will not
prevent a period of confusion in lower courts as to how they are
supposed to approach decision makers that are just beginning to
grapple with human rights issues.
This forces any potential
developments in the nexus between judicial review and the duty to
accommodate into a jurisprudential holding pattern.
In the
immediate future, it is possible and even likely that rather than follow
Justice Abella’s notional trajectory toward Justice Wilson’s highly
deferential dissent in National Corn Growers, courts may read
Dunsmuir as partial rejection of the ever-increasing deference enjoyed
by administrative tribunals. This could significantly hinder tribunals’
ability to take the leading role in human rights adjudication
envisioned for them in VIA Rail.
Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para. 45.
Ibid. at para 48
38 Ibid. quoting from David Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review
and Democracy” in M. Taggart, ed., The Province of Administrative Law (1997), 279
36
37

at 286.
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